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During the last 50 years, comparative cognition and neurosciences have improved our
understanding of animal minds while evolutionary ecology has revealed how selection
acts on traits through evolutionary time. We describe how cognition can be subject to
natural selection like any other biological trait and how this evolutionary approach can
be used to understand the evolution of animal cognition. We recount how comparative
and fitness methods have been used to understand the evolution of cognition and
outline how these approaches could extend our understanding of cognition. The fitness
approach, in particular, offers unprecedented opportunities to study the evolutionary
mechanisms responsible for variation in cognition within species and could allow us to
investigate both proximate (i.e., neural and developmental) and ultimate (i.e., ecological
and evolutionary) underpinnings of animal cognition together. We highlight recent studies
that have successfully shown that cognitive traits can be under selection, in particular
by linking individual variation in cognition to fitness. To bridge the gap between cognitive
variation and fitness consequences and to better understand why and how selection
can occur on cognition, we end this review by proposing a more integrative approach
to study contemporary selection on cognitive traits combining socio-ecological data,
minimally invasive neuroscience methods and measurement of ecologically relevant
behaviors linked to fitness. Our overall goal in this review is to build a bridge between
cognitive neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists, illustrate how their research could
be complementary, and encourage evolutionary ecologists to include explicit attention
to cognitive processes in their studies of behavior.
Keywords: cognitive ecology, natural selection, heredity, brood parasites, fitness cost, individual differences,
path analysis
INTRODUCTION
Niko Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963) proposed that biologists should try to understand animal
behaviors in the light of two different and complimentary perspectives: the proximate and ultimate
(see Laland et al., 2011; Bateson and Laland, 2013 for recent updates). While both approaches
have been employed in the study of animal cognition, most studies have done so independently
with little integration across fields. Indeed, even the language used in these two fields has diverged:
“behavior” in cognitive sciences refers to the specific motor response to a cognitive test whereas
“behavior” to evolutionary ecologists, the definition we follow in this review, refers to complex
responses to social and ecological situations (e.g., mate choice, predator alarms, etc. . .) that often
are an amalgamation of many different cognitive abilities. After some promising, integrative studies
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in the 1980s and 1990s (see Kamil, 1998 for a review), the last
decades have seen the establishment of entirely independent lines
of research with only a few notable exceptions. We now have a
deeper understanding of how animal minds work, but we know
very little about the evolution of or ecological pressures that shape
cognition. Consequently, we know very little about what role
cognition, a collection of highly plastic and flexible traits, plays in
adaptation and biological evolution. We believe the time is ripe
for evolutionary ecology studies to explicitly integrate cognition
to generate a much stronger understanding of how the mind
evolves.
Proximate studies focus on the mechanisms underlying given
behaviors and the developmental biology of key structures. What
stimuli trigger behaviors? How do neurons in the brain encode
stimuli and transform them into behavior? What is the ontogeny
of behavior? In other words, the proximate approach tries to
understand how animal minds work. The current view for
cognitive neuroscientists is that the animal mind emerges from
brain activity as the neural machinery encodes, manipulates,
stores and recalls information, which is together called ‘cognition.’
Cognition emerges when the brain transforms information into
mental constructs or representations (Roitblat, 1982; Gallistel,
1990; Barsalou, 2014). For cognitive scientists, cognition is a
synonym of ‘mind,’ which, operationally, is divided in various
cognitive functions. Each function is implied in a specific step of
information processing and thus plays a major role in ecologically
relevant behaviors studied by behavioral ecologists (see also
Figure 1). For readers not familiar with these functions, we
define them here quickly highlighting the role they could play
in the behavior of wild animals. Perception (i.e., vision, olfaction,
audition, gustation, and somesthesia) contributes to the process
by which mental representations are built from environmental
stimulation. Most behaviors that are at least partially triggered
by external stimuli rely on perception. Mate choice for instance
necessitates first seeing or hearing a conspecific and recognizing
it as a potential mate. The same thing is true for detecting prey
or a predator. Learning is the ability to associate previously
unrelated mental representations. Learning is ubiquitous in the
behavior of wild animal. Even behaviors that have long been
thought of as innate such as mate preference and imprinting
seem to partially depend on learning (Verzijden et al., 2012).
Memory is the ability to store mental representations either for
a small amount of time (short term memory), a large amount
of time (long term memory) or in relation to a particular
on-going task (working memory). Short-term memory can be
used to avoid already used food patches during foraging. Long-
term memory plays a crucial role for animals that cache food
in fall for winter use or for choosing a breeding habitat in
migrating species according to experience in previous years.
Working memory might be important during parental care for
distributing food to all offspring despite disturbance. Attention
is the mechanism allowing an individual to focus on only
some mental representations among many. Attention can be
exogenous, when a representation suddenly appears in the
environment, for example during predator detection, or it
can be endogenous when an animal is internally searching
for one particular representation such as during foraging
for specific prey. Decision-making is the process enabling an
individual to compare mental representations and choose the
most appropriate given the environmental context. Decision-
making probably enters in the process of choosing a mate
or a habitat among other things. Finally, executive functions
(flexibility, categorization, problem solving etc. . .) enable an
individual to perform operations and manipulations of mental
representations. Flexibility, the ability to inhibit a previous
association between representations to form a new one, appears
crucial during dispersal to a new environment, choice of
food in dynamic environments, and many social interactions.
Categorization, the capability to group similar representations
together, probably enables recognition of new kind of predators
or preys. Problem solving, which is less well defined, is probably
used by species living in urban environment or that use tools
for foraging. Cognition is also sometimes divided according to
the nature of the representation; one can for instance talk about
spatial or social cognition. Homing or food caching relies on
spatial cognition while discovery of new food patches or new
foraging technics by observing conspecifics implies a certain level
of social cognition.
The association between studies in psychology and
neurosciences along with the advent of powerful new
neuroimaging techniques [e.g., In vivo electrophysiology,
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Positron emission
Tomography (PET), optogenetic etc.] has lead us to better
understand how cognitive functions are linked to neural
structures and neural activity in several animal species including
humans. Despite this in depth understanding, much less progress
has been made in understanding the evolutionary processes that
have led to the patterns of cognition that we see (but see De Kort
and Clayton, 2006).
Ultimate approaches focus on the evolutionary history of
behaviors or traits and the selective pressures that favor the
evolution of those traits. Those using this approach have focused
on behaviors with only a few rare studies examining cognition per
se (Bond and Kamil, 2002, 2006; Théry and Casas, 2002; Lyon,
2003). Evolutionary biologists and behavioral ecologists have been
primarily interested in the ecology and evolution of behavior
without examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying these
behaviors. What ecological or social contexts are responsible for
the evolution of a specific behavior? What role does evolutionary
history (inheritance from a common ancestor) play in the
evolution of that trait? What are the costs and benefits of
behaviors and what do they imply for selection on the animal’s life
history strategy? To answer these questions behavioral ecologists
have adopted the Neo-Darwinian theoretical framework and
developed tools and models to understand the extreme variability
of behaviors within and among species. However, this approach
focuses on the aggregate outcome of cognition and action (i.e.,
the behavior) and has usually considered the animal mind, or
cognition, as a black box (Giraldeau, 2004). Indeed, much of
behavioral or evolutionary ecology theory is based on strategic
decision-making. While in some cases these strategic decisions
reflect physiological trade-offs, many more cases reflect decisions
made probably on the basis of processing external information
gathered by an individual. Attention in such studies is placed
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FIGURE 1 | Mate choice and cognitive capacities that could hypothetically play a role. In bi-parental breeding songbirds, choosing an appropriate mate
according to available male stock, previous breeding experience and actual environmental conditions is a behavior that will have drastic fitness consequences for
any female and that is likely to rely on the interplay between various cognitive functions. Recognition of ornaments linked to different male qualities (e.g., good genes,
parental care, nest defense, etc.) uses perception (visual and auditory) to detect male signals and categorization to group and identify male quality according to their
ornaments (1). The use of previous breeding experience relies on past learning linking male ornaments and reproductive success from previous experiences (2). Mate
choice itself, integrates all information available to the female including current ecology, mate options, and past experience supposedly through decision-making
mechanisms (3). Finding the chosen mate, once the decision has been taken, probably relies on spatial memory to relocate the territory defended by the chosen
male and endogenous attention to detect the chosen male from among the background of other males and environmental features (4).
on the quality of information and the outcome of a decision,
but there is little understanding of how information is processed
and how cognitive abilities enhance or constrain decisions based
on the available information (but see Rowe, 1999, 2013; Stevens
et al., 2005). For example, social behavior, individual recognition,
mate choice, parental care, dispersal, foraging, and predator
avoidance nearly always rely on gathering external information.
How well an individual gathers that information, how well it
remembers that information, and how it integrates different
sources of information all depend on cognitive capacities – but
these are rarely examined in studies of behavior. To illustrate
this notion (Figure 1) we can imagine a female who must
choose the best mate among males that each display a number of
ornaments linked to various qualities (e.g., good genes, parental
care, nest defense, etc. . .). A behavioral ecologist would examine
the outcome of female choice behavior – compare males who
were chosen relative to those who were not – to understand
how male traits evolve. But female behavior is determined by a
number of cognitive functions. How does a female integrate the
information provided in each of the male’s sexual signals with
information about the external ecological environment (e.g., are
there many nest predators)? As the female comparison shops for
the best male, how many of the males can she remember? If she
chooses to return to the second male she saw, will she remember
where he is and will she recognize him? This example illustrates
just some of the cognitive processes related to one behavior
that would have fundamental consequences for sexual selection
theory. Many other behaviors and life history strategies will
similarly depend on cognitive capacities and actual measurement
of cognitive performances has the potential to fundamentally
alter our views of behavior.
Our understanding of cognition and neurosciences could
benefit from increased integration with evolution. The
evolutionary history of species can help reveal how different
cognitive functions or neural structures come about and can
reveal constraints in the evolution of more complex cognition.
Furthermore, understanding how selection in a natural setting
acts on cognition and neural structures could reveal why specific
abilities or mechanisms arise in some systems but not others.
Understanding the evolutionary and ecological significance of
cognition has been a major challenge in biology as highlighted
in several recent books (Heyes and Huber, 2000; Dukas and
Ratcliffe, 2009; Shettleworth, 2010) and review articles (Real,
1993; Kamil, 1998; Healy and Braithwaite, 2000; Dukas, 2004,
2008; Pravosudov and Smulders, 2010; Boogert et al., 2011;
MacLean et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 2012, 2014; Pravosudov
and Roth, 2013; Rowe and Healy, 2014; Croston et al., 2015;
Morand-Ferron and Quinn, 2015) and has led to a new field
of research called cognitive ecology. We argue that two factors
will help significantly advance our understanding of animal
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cognition: (1) proximate and ultimate studies should develop
lines of research that allow direct integration of the two fields
and (2) that evolutionary studies begin to apply their research
methods to cognition per se along with the behaviors that
result from cognitive processes. In doing so, we will gain a
better understanding of how cognitive systems evolve and how
cognitive structures and function relate to the problems they
evolved to solve.
Here, we first argue that brain and cognition are subject
to natural selection just like any other biological trait. We
then review past work testing popular hypotheses for cognitive
evolution using comparative methods and highlight future
directions to exploit using these methods. After this, we illustrate
how measuring selection on cognition within a species provides a
great opportunity to better understand the evolution of cognition.
These two methods differ in the time scale of evolution that
they measure (past vs. current) and each provides advantages
and disadvantages. We then continue by presenting two lines of
research as case studies—food hoarding and brood parasitism—
that, in our view, have best integrated ecological challenges,
natural behavior and underlying cognitive adaptation and which
could serve as examples for future cognitive ecology research.
We finish by arguing how more integrative studies can help us
to understand how and why neurocognitive traits can be under
selection in contemporary populations.
BRAIN AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS
ARE SUBJECT TO NATURAL SELECTION
To show that animal cognition evolves under direct natural
selection requires that the three necessary conditions for selection
and evolution that Darwin (1859, 1871) outlined apply to
cognitive functions and brain (Dukas, 2004). Traits, or in this
case cognitive functions, will evolve if (1) there is variability
in cognition between individuals, (2) that this variability in
cognitive performances is heritable, and (3) that this variation
is related to variance in fitness (survival, reproductive success)
under specific environmental conditions. Few studies have
tackled these questions specifically, but evidence from the
literature supports the notion that cognition should evolve under
selection.
Variation in Neurocognitive Ability
Inter-individual variability in animal cognition studies is rarely
reported, yet without variation, cognition can not evolve.
Studies in animal cognition generally focus on a small number
of individuals because of the time involved in training and
testing subjects and this small sample size precludes useful
estimates of variation in cognitive performances. However, a
recent meta-analysis of variation in individual performances
at three common cognitive tasks for different species revealed
very high inter-individual variability (Thornton and Lukas,
2012). Individual performances varied almost continuously from
25 to 100% success at a task in tests for species with the
largest sample sizes. Some of this variation is influenced by
age, sex, developmental conditions, or previous experience, so
determining the extent of variation due to additive genes rather
than plasticity will require large sample sizes at single cognitive
tasks.
Despite little direct evidence, there are a number of indirect
measures of cognitive variability that further support the notion
that intraspecific variation in cognitive performances should
be widespread. A growing number of recent studies focus on
intraspecific variation in brain size including both within and
among population variation (for a review see Gonda et al.,
2013). This variation is also apparent in humans where inter-
individual variation in brain structure and function has often
been considered “noise” until recently (Kanai and Rees, 2011).
Perhaps the best evidence of inter-individual cognitive variation
comes from research on “general intelligence” in humans, which
has been extensively documented through the use of intelligence
or ‘IQ’ tests and shows high variation among individuals (Deary
et al., 2010). Recent work has sought to tie variation between IQ
in humans to its neural substrate (Deary et al., 2010; Penke et al.,
2012).
Heritability of Neurocognitive Abilities
Heritability of traits is difficult to measure since many non-
genetic effects (common environment, parental care, maternal
effects, etc. . .) contribute to resemblance between parents and
offspring. For example, twin studies show that brain structure
or function (e.g., face recognition) is heritable in humans
(Peper et al., 2007; Wilmer et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2010), yet
non-genetic effects that occur in utero can not be excluded
(but see Trzaskowski et al., 2013). One of the most powerful
approaches to demonstrate that heritability of cognitive traits
exists is through artificial selection experiments where species
show phenotypic changes in response to researcher imposed
selection criteria. Mery and Kawecki (2002, 2003, 2005) have
shown that associative learning abilities for choice of oviposition
substrate can be inherited in Drosophila melanogaster (see
Kawecki, 2010 for a review; ). Marked differences in learning and
memory were shown between high learning and low learning
selected Drosophila populations over 15 generations. Artificial
selection of brain size in guppies (Poecilia reticulata) also
suggests heritability of brain size (Kotrschal et al., 2013a) with
a divergence in relative brain size of 9% between lines selected
for large vs. small size over just two generations. Interestingly,
large-brained females outperformed small-brained females in a
numerical learning test, which also provides evidence for an
association between increased brain size and higher cognition.
These results should be treated cautiously since disentangling
true heritability from plasticity would require more than two
generations and a relaxation of selection to see if brain size
differences persist (but see Healy and Rowe, 2013; Kotrschal
et al., 2013b). Finally, the use of genome wide association
has recently been used to demonstrate a genetic basis of
human general intelligence and cognition. This approach has
shown that a substantial proportion (between 40 and 66%) of
individual differences in human general intelligence is linked
to genetic variation (Davies et al., 2011; Benyamin et al., 2013;
but see Chabris et al., 2012; Deary et al., 2012; Plomin et al.,
2013).
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However, estimating heritability of brain or cognitive traits in
wild animal populations remains an exciting challenge (Croston
et al., 2015).
The Fitness Benefits of Cognition
Selection on cognitive abilities will occur if there are fitness
benefits to particular cognitive phenotypes under a given
set of environmental conditions. Addressing this question is
challenging because it requires both an estimate of cognitive
performance or brain structure/activity of a large number of
individuals as well as fitness estimates, such as reproductive
success or survival, for the same individuals. Most cognitive
tests are run under laboratory conditions to control confounding
effects on cognition and yet the best estimates of fitness benefits
should be measured in the wild where the importance of a specific
cognitive ability will also depend on the environmental context.
Fitness measured in artificial selection experiments on cognition
or brain size have reported costs and benefits of improved
cognitive performances in insects (Dukas, 2008; Kawecki, 2010)
or increased brain size in fishes (Kotrschal et al., 2013a), but
the value of these traits in nature are unknown. In humans,
general intelligence is correlated with school achievement, job
performance, health, and survival (Deary et al., 2010), but not
necessarily actual fitness (i.e., number of lifetime offspring that
reproduce).
PHYLOGENETIC COMPARATIVE
STUDIES OF BRAIN AND COGNITION
EVOLUTION
Current tests of factors that influence the evolution of cognition
have largely relied on comparative methods. The phylogenetic
comparative approach (Felsenstein, 1985, 2008; Grafen, 1989;
Harvey and Pagel, 1991; Ridley and Grafen, 1996; Felsenstein
and Felenstein, 2004) allows us to ask questions about how
the evolution of a trait occurs through comparison of extant
species (although fossil evidence can be incorporated) while
taking into account shared ancestry estimated from a phylogeny.
We can then ask questions such as what factors (e.g., social or
ecological) are associated with the evolution of a trait in the past
(e.g., brain size), if that trait evolves directionally, how much
common ancestry constrains evolution, and how the evolution
of a trait influences speciation rates. Two major drawbacks to
this approach are that causality cannot be determined given the
correlative nature of the analyses and that past environments, and
therefore past selection pressures, must be inferred from present
conditions which may not always be a valid assumption.
The three major hypotheses of neurocognitive evolution that
have been proposed focus on identifying primary factors that
have driven differences in brain size and cognitive function
across species. The first set of hypotheses suggest that cognition
has evolved due to the value of ecological intelligence; the
ability to find and extract food (Parker and Gibson, 1977;
Byrne, 1997), manage high spatiotemporal variation in food
resources (Sol et al., 2005), or manage and defend large
territories (Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1980). The second set of
hypotheses propose that cognition has evolved primarily due to
its value in social intelligence; the ability to negotiate and succeed
through dominance in large groups (Whiten and Byrne, 1988;
Dunbar, 1998) or alternatively the ability to manage positive
relationships and social partnerships (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007,
2010; Emery et al., 2007). The third hypothesis, recently proposed
to reconcile ecological and social drivers, suggests that cognition
evolved to buffer individuals against environmental challenges
by producing appropriate behavioral responses in new socio-
ecological contexts (Allman and Hasenstaub, 1999; Deaner et al.,
2003; Sol, 2009).
Each of the above hypotheses has been tested using
comparative methods and each has found some support. For
example, brain size depends on diet in mammals (Eisenberg and
Wilson, 1978; Harvey et al., 1980; Gittleman, 1986; MacLean
et al., 2014) suggesting a role for ecology. Likewise, brain size and
neocortex size are related to social group size (Gittleman, 1986;
Marino, 1996; Barton and Dunbar, 1997; Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar
and Bever, 1998) and other metrics of social group structure in
mammals (reviewed in Dunbar and Shultz, 2007) suggesting that
social drivers are also important to the evolution of the brain and
presumably cognition. Interestingly, comparison of ecological
and social factors in ungulates, showed that relative brain size
is influenced by both social and ecological factors while relative
neocortex size is only influenced by sociality (Shultz and Dunbar,
2006). Finally, species with larger brains have been shown to
survive better in novel environments (Sol et al., 2005, 2007, 2008)
in support to the cognitive buffer hypothesis (Sol, 2009).
Comparative studies focused on brain size have also been
largely criticized (Healy and Rowe, 2007; Roth et al., 2010a;
Lihoreau et al., 2012). The high cognitive capacity of small-
brained invertebrates, such as bees and ants, suggests that
high cognitive capabilities do not require large overall brain
size (Chittka and Niven, 2009). Initial research in comparative
cognition used brain size as a coarse proxy for cognition, since
morphological data for a broad variety of species is more
readily available whereas finer scale measures of cognition or
neurophysiology are not. However, measurements of brain size
or brain structure volumes are too coarse grained given that
current neuroscience methods enable us to study fine scale
brain organization and function (Healy and Rowe, 2007; Roth
et al., 2010a). For instance, cognitive neurosciences have revealed
different brain networks and mechanism associated with different
cognitive functions (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Grossberg,
2000; Fox et al., 2005; Meunier et al., 2009; Alivisatos et al.,
2013; Smith et al., 2013; Vanduffel et al., 2014). Thus, instead
of studying whole brain or neocortex size, comparative studies
should focus on neural circuits and functioning that are known to
be involved in the cognitive mechanism of interest when possible
(Lihoreau et al., 2012).
Adaptive specialization of the hippocampus stands as one
of the best examples illustrating how overall brain size per se
could be a poor proxy for cognitive function. Storing and non-
storing passerines do not differ in whole brain size or all spatial
abilities but do differ in specific hippocampal structures and
specific components of spatial memory (Krebs, 1990; Sherry
et al., 1992; Clayton and Krebs, 1993, 1994a,b; Krebs et al., 1996;
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Shettleworth, 2003; Healy et al., 2009). Similarly homing pigeons
have much larger hippocampus size compared to other wild
and domestic pigeons (Rehkämper et al., 1988) as a result of
artificial selection for spatial abilities (Rehkämper et al., 2008). As
with storing passerines, only a specific part of the hippocampus
seems to play a role in homing with distinctive roles of the
left and right hippocampus linked to different components of
homing behaviors in pigeons (Bingman et al., 2003, 2006; Kahn
and Bingman, 2004; Bingman and Cheng, 2005; Gagliardo et al.,
2005; Siegel et al., 2006). Unfortunately such detailed data on
neural structures and the volume of specific brain regions is only
available for a small number of species. Increasingly accessible
neuro-cognitive imaging tools will soon allow phylogenetic
comparative studies to focus on scales finer than brain size.
Efforts to address the problem that cognitive abilities cannot
accurately be summarized solely by brain size have been made
along two lines of comparative research: (i) spontaneous records
of cognition-based behaviors (e.g., innovation) in the wild and (ii)
comparative psychology experiments in the lab. The first line of
research, also called ‘taxonomical counts of cognition in the wild’
(reviewed in Lefebvre, 2011), enables the study of large samples of
“spontaneous” behavior occurring in the selective environment
or at least a natural or semi-natural habitat. This approach has
confirmed that relative brain size increases with increased tool
use and frequency of innovation in birds (Lefebvre et al., 1997,
2004) and primates (Reader and Laland, 2002; Lefebvre et al.,
2004), social learning in primates (Reader and Laland, 2002), or
deception in primates (Byrne, 2004).
Taking the second approach, a few studies have begun
comparing specific cognitive tasks among a small number of
related species that differ in social or ecological conditions.
One of the most advanced research programs of this kind, has
been conducted on North American corvids (Balda et al., 1996;
Kamil, 1998; Balda and Kamil, 2002) using a large number
of cognitive tests run in the lab. Corvid species that rely
heavily on food storing in the wild, such as Clark’s Nutcrakers
(Nucifraga columbiana), typically outperform other corvids in
tasks requiring spatial cognition (Olson et al., 1995); on the
other hand, corvid species that are highly social, such as
Pinyon Jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus), are better in cognition
tasks mimicking social challenges such as those designed
to evaluate social learning, behavioral flexibility or transitive
inference (Templeton et al., 1999; Bond et al., 2003, 2007,
2010). Studies in primates have similarly addressed how social
structure is related to the evolution of cognitive performances.
Comparing species that differ in their degree of sociality, Amici
et al. (2008) have shown that species with fission-fusion social
organization outperform species with very stable social groups
in cognitive tasks requiring inhibitory control and/or flexibility.
Very recently, one of the most accomplished studies merging
phylogenetic and experimental cognition methods draws a
slightly different picture (MacLean et al., 2014). MacLean and
his 57 collaborators realized the feat of gathering cognitive
performances of 36 animal species (from birds to rodents to
apes) in two problem solving tasks measuring self-control. Their
results suggest that the major proximate mechanism underlying
the evolution of self-control is the absolute brain volume rather
than residual brain volume corrected for body mass. They also
report a significant relationship between cognitive performance
and dietary breadth but not social organization in primates. Thus,
this massive comparative cognition study challenges both the
proxy of cognition (relative brain size) and the hypothesis (social
brain hypothesis) tested in many brain size comparative studies
and illustrates the danger of over interpreting comparative
cognition studies. Continued efforts to link specific cognitive
functions to their ecological and social settings present a
promising avenue to understand the evolution of cognition while
recognizing that different cognitive abilities may evolve under
different environmental contexts. Doing comparative analyses
on specific cognitive functions could become possible with the
advent of increasingly automated test devices for measuring
cognitive function to help build the sorts of across species
datasets needed (Steurer et al., 2012; Morand-Ferron et al.,
2015b).
A number of new directions using the comparative method
have still not been sufficiently exploited. First and foremost,
analyses should begin to compare specific regions of the brain,
neural structure, or brain function rather than coarse measures
of brain size. The increasing ease of using new technology
(e.g., MRI, PET) to measure brain structures, connectivity, and
function that are frequently measured in cognitive neurosciences
could provide new insights on the link between the evolution of
cognitive processes and ecological or social factors that influence
cognition. Use of the comparative method on neural structure
itself is generally lacking but could provide a very perspective
on how the mind might evolve (Brenowitz and Zakon, 2015).
Second, only a small range of questions using comparative
methods have been addressed (see MacLean et al., 2012 for
a review). For example, comparative methods can be used to
examine the sequence of events in coevolution such that we
could ask if the increase of a cognitive performance generally
precedes or succeeds specific social or ecological changes.
Likewise, we could examine the relative rates of evolution during
the increase or decrease of a particular cognitive function.
When we have measures of multiple cognitive structures or
functions, we can also ask if phylogenetic patterns suggest
an evolutionary trade-off between cognitive capacities, if they
are independent, or if they evolve together. Indeed, mixing
levels could allow us to ask if specific cognitive abilities usually
coevolve with specific neural structures. Finally, we can ask how
shifts in cognition are associated with the speciation process
itself (Nicolakakis et al., 2003). Does the evolution of increased
cognitive ability facilitate speciation? The biggest drawback
to comparative methods, of course, is that it is correlative,
thus preventing explicit tests of causation. Yet it provides an
excellent tool to generate hypotheses that can then be tested in
contemporary evolution studies. Comparative methods are also
based on a number of key assumptions that may not always
hold. We assume that the underlying phylogeny is true, that past
environments and traits are similar to present ones, and that
evolution is parsimonious which may not be valid for highly
labile traits. Still, the comparative approach is unequaled in
the breadth of taxonomic diversity and depth of evolutionary
time.
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INTRASPECIFIC SELECTION ON
NEUROCOGNITIVE TRAITS: THE
FITNESS APPROACH
Measuring contemporary selection has proved a powerful
approach to understanding the evolution of traits and this
method could be readily applied to the evolution of cognition.
The basic premise of this ‘fitness’ approach follows Darwin’s
(1859) theory of evolution which suggests that short term
selection is the primary cause of evolutionary change and
speciation. Therefore a careful examination of selection can help
us understand how a trait evolves. An important caveat with
this approach, though, is that we assume contemporary selection
that we measure is representative of selection pressures that have
led to current expression of cognition in a species. Selection
can come from a number of origins which largely fall under
natural selection, which includes the effects of abiotic influences
and interspecific interactions on survival and reproduction
(Darwin, 1859; and modern synthesis in Huxley, 1942), or
social selection (West-Eberhard, 1983; Lyon and Montgomerie,
2012), which includes selection due to intraspecific social
interactions including the effects of mating behavior (i.e., sexual
selection, Darwin, 1871) and kin cooperation (i.e., kin selection,
Hamilton, 1964) among other intraspecific interactions. Both
of these forms of selection could act on cognitive functions
and their underlying neural basis as described above (Boogert
et al., 2011; Morand-Ferron and Quinn, 2015). There are
two distinct advantages to the fitness method relative to the
comparative method for studying neurocognitive evolution. The
first advantage is that studies of contemporary selection measure
fitness costs and benefits of specific traits which can provide a
close match with measurements of cognitive performances and
brain mechanisms currently studied in animal cognition and
neurosciences (Figure 2). Thus the fitness approach provides
opportunities to integrate our proximate understanding of
cognition with new findings on the ultimate causes of cognitive
evolution. The second advantage is that examination of selection
ideally includes identification of the agent of selection or the
specific social or ecological challenges that favor a specific trait.
Adopting this approach helps us acknowledge that there may
be multiple factors that select for a given cognitive ability and
in some cases these factors might not act in concert (Figure 3).
Likewise, it makes clear that each species will require only a subset
of all cognitive skills given their environment. Of course the
added depth of such studies come at a cost relative to comparative
studies of cognitive evolution: time intensive fitness studies limit
the range of species studied and thus provide a narrower, if
deeper, view of evolution across species.
Studies specifically employing the fitness approach to
understand the evolution of cognition are quite rare, but
increasing interest is feeding the burgeoning field of cognitive
ecology. As such, we are far from drawing general conclusions
from such studies, but recent examples do illustrate the promise
of this approach. Two recent studies have finally succeeded in
measuring fitness consequences of problem-solving abilities in
wild populations of great tits (Parus major; Cole et al., 2012;
Cauchard et al., 2013). Cole et al. (2012) took birds into short
term captivity to perform an innovation task to get food. Birds
who solved the task had larger clutch sizes, but tended to desert
their nest more often if disturbed (Cole et al., 2012). Cauchard
et al. (2013) conducted cognitive tests in the wild, where birds
had to remove an obstacle that blocked access to their nestbox.
Those who could solve the puzzle had higher survival of
offspring to fledging. Both studies found individual variation
in cognitive performance of birds (solvers vs. non-solvers), so
selection should act on problem solving abilities. Fitness costs
of higher cognition (e.g., higher desertion rates; Cole et al.,
2012), could produce a trade-off that helps maintain variation
in cognitive abilities among individuals. Such a result is an
important insight into the evolution of cognition: multiple
selection pressures on the same cognitive trait would drastically
change their evolutionary dynamics (e.g., speed of evolution)
and trajectories (sequence of trait values on the path to an
optimum; Lande and Arnold, 1983; Schluter, 1996; Sinervo and
Svensson, 2002). These results are very promising, and should
be diversified to a much broader range of cognitive functions
(e.g., memory, learning, flexibility, etc. . .) and expanded to
measures of brain structure or function (Figure 2). Furthermore,
following pioneering research linking food hoarding behavior
and spatial memory (see Pravosudov and Roth, 2013 for a
review), understanding why cognition evolves will also require
us to directly link cognitive performance (e.g., memory) to
ecological challenges that the animals face in their natural
environment (e.g., finding a food store). This last point is critical
because if there are correlations among different cognitive
abilities then measurement of selection (i.e., higher fitness) on
one ability could be due to correlational selection on a different
cognitive trait that is the actual target of selection (Lande and
Arnold, 1983).
The above examples provide evidence for selection of
cognitive abilities in wild animals, so the next big challenge for
cognitive ecology is to identify which cognitive functions are
critical for a species in their natural environment. While for
most species we are still at the point of forming hypotheses on
which cognitive abilities are critical (as we did for mate choice in
Figure 1), there are a few studies that have moved well beyond
this stage. Here we present two lines of research as examples
of successfully linking natural behavior, cognitive function and
ecological agents of selection. These studies contain elements of
the fitness approach, but neither is complete: the first example
lacks measures of fitness whereas the second has not studied
cognitive abilities per se. Still, they illustrate how elements of the
fitness approach can lead to new discoveries and insights into
how cognition evolves.
CASE STUDIES
The Evolutionary Ecology of Spatial
Memory
Food hoarding animals rely on food caching and later retrieval
of caches to survive winter and should have evolved excellent
spatial memory abilities and associated neural structures (i.e.,
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FIGURE 2 | How to study brain and cognition selection? Ideal studies looking at contemporary selection on neurocognitive traits should integrate
socio-ecological conditions (left), neurocognitive traits (middle left), ecologically relevant behaviors (middle right), and fitness (right) variables. Such an approach
seeks to truly merge behavioral and evolutionary (green background) and cognitive neuroscience (yellow background) methods. As examples: Socio-ecological
contexts of selection could correspond to natural gradients in sociality (i.e., Population density, gregariousness), habitat quality (i.e., level of fragmentation,
urbanization) and/or distribution of resources (i.e., harshness of the environment). Experimental manipulations of ecological factors, such as variation in food
supplementation or reintroduction in a novel environment, are of particular interest to isolate ecological causes of selection. Cognitive abilities can be measured in the
wild using automated foraging tasks. Such methods rely on individual identification usually mediated by passive integrated transponders (PIT) tags. However, some
cognitive functions are difficult to measure in the wild and one may want to have a better control on motivational state and environmental parameters. Short-term
periods of captivity seem appropriate in such a framework and potentially enable us to use current psychophysics protocols and equipment developed in
comparative cognition labs. Development of embedded cameras or microphones has the potential to reveal spontaneous cognitive capabilities like tool use, social
cognition or vocal communication. Likewise, neurologgers or transmitters enable us to measure brain activity (electroencephalogram, single unit activity) in free
ranging wild animals. Spatial and whole brain measurement could also be assessed using MRI or PET devices in short term scanning protocol. Ecologically relevant
behaviors linked to fitness such as parental care, mate choice, foraging, predator avoidance, should be measured to evaluate interactions between agents of
selection and between cognitive abilities that are hypothesized to underlie these behaviors. The fitness benefit is traditionally assessed through evaluation of
reproductive success (number of offspring who breed) or a measure of survival. Behavior associated with reproductive success (i.e., mating, number of offspring
born, parental care) can also be used as proxies of fitness.
hippocampus). Based on this simple ecology-driven hypothesis,
a flourishing literature on the cognitive ecology of food storing
has emerged over the last 30 years. This work has successfully
combined proximate and ultimate understandings of spatial
cognition and serves as an example for future studies of the
evolutionary ecology of cognition (see Brodin, 2010 for an
historical review).
The first studies of the evolutionary and ecological significance
of spatial memory employed the comparative framework, with
the prediction that scatter food hoarding species should surpass
non-hoarding species in spatial memory tasks and should have a
relatively bigger hippocampus. However, results from these early
studies were equivocal and difficult to interpret. The superiority
of spatial capabilities in hoarding species was not always
clear (reviewed in Healy et al., 2009). Furthermore, and more
concerning, the comparative approach suffers from a number of
confounding factors, such as morphological differences between
species, that could never clearly be separated from performance
in cognitive tasks [but see Kamil, 1998 for methods].
Problems with comparative analyses have been very elegantly
solved by focusing on intra-specific variation in a number of
landmark studies comparing populations exposed to different
ecological contexts. In one of the earliest of such studies,
Pravosudov and Clayton (2002) demonstrated that black-
capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) living in harsh winter
climates (i.e., Alaska) cache more food, have higher spatial
memory capabilities, and have a larger hippocampus that
contains more neurons than individuals of the same species
in populations from milder climates (i.e., Colorado). While
the appearance of adaptation is clear, such differences could
reflect either local adaptation shaped by natural selection
or result from plasticity in brain structure and behavior
generated from the local environment. The persistence of among
population differences in brain structure and caching behavior in
common garden experiments, during which 10 days-old chicks
from these different populations were hand-raised in identical
environmental conditions, strongly argues for a role of natural
selection in shaping local adaptation for spatial memory, neural
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FIGURE 3 | Mapping the relationship between traits and how selection
acts on cognition: a path approach. Schematic example of a generic,
hypothetical path analysis linking fitness (number of babies) that depends on
two behaviors (parental care and territory defense), which in turn are
dependent on a number of cognitive abilities. Arrows show the direction in
which selection acts with solid arrows showing a positive relationship and
dashed arrows a negative relationship and the thickness of arrows represents
the strength of the relationship (partial correlation coefficient). Note that the
direction opposite the arrows should indicate effects that underlie the above
measure; for example, Cog1 plays an important role in the expression of
Behav1. In this example, each behavior is linked to a number of cognitive
abilities, but in different ways. Each behavior is linked to one cognitive ability
that is only associated with that one behavior (Cog1 and Cog5), but also three
other cognitive abilities that are also linked to both behaviors (Cog2–4).
Cognitive traits that influence both behaviors show different patterns: attention
(Cog 2, 3) shows opposite patterns between the two behaviors whereas
memory (Cog4) has a positive relationship with both behaviors. The resulting
selection and evolutionary dynamics will reflect these patterns: intense
positive selection on memory, but more muted selection on attention. Path
models can also estimate the relationship between traits such as the negative
relationship we illustrate here as a double headed arrow (correlation with no
causation implied) between parental care behavior and territory defense often
thought to be antagonistic due to the effects of testosterone on each behavior.
density, and neurogenesis in the hippocampus (Roth et al., 2010b,
2012).
Recent analyses using this within species comparative
approach in this and other species have further pushed our
understanding of the links between cognition and evolutionary
ecology and between proximate and ultimate understandings
of cognitive evolution. Research in mountain chickadees
(P. gambeli) along an altitudinal gradient has shown similar
patterns of differentiation in food storage, spatial memory,
and hippocampal characteristics as with contrasted populations
in the black-capped chickadee (Freas et al., 2013). Other
studies have extended this work on spatial memory differences
across populations in caching behavior to differences between
behavioral strategies within a population (LaDage et al., 2013).
In side-blotched lizards (Uta stansburiana), males adopt one of
three different mating strategies that rely to different degrees
on spatial memory for territory defense and the distribution of
available females across territories. Accordingly, characteristics
of the dorsal cortex and hippocampus show differences among
genetically determined alternative male strategies within a
population (Ladage et al., 2009; LaDage et al., 2013). Work on
hippocampal size contrasts among populations has recently been
extended by fine scale studies of neural structure (Roth et al.,
2010a, 2012) and differential gene expression (Pravosudov et al.,
2013) within the hippocampus among contrasted populations of
birds. The next step should be to measure the influence of spatial
cognition and the underlying hippocampal structures or function
on fitness in these contrasted environments.
Cognitive Mechanisms of Host–Parasite
Arm Races in Brood Parasites
Avian brood parasites lay their eggs in the nest of other
individuals from the same or different species to avoids the costs
of parental care but imposes a cost on the host (reviewed in
Davies, 2011). These reciprocal selection pressures have often led
to an arms race of detection and mimicry in egg appearance – a
true cognitive battleground even if these studies do not measure
specific cognitive functions. Studies of avian brood parasitism
provide measures of selection on cognitive traits (recognition,
rejection, deception), clear identification of the agent of selection,
examination of how cognition influences the coevolutionary
arms race, and neural traits associated with host–parasite life
history.
Studies of avian brood parasitism have done an outstanding
job of quantifying the fitness costs and benefits to each player
of the host–parasite arms race—often linked to recognition of
parasites (Lyon and Eadie, 2008; Davies, 2011). A parasite’s fitness
is so intricately tied to acceptance by hosts that they must adapt
to new host defenses either by identifying and changing to a new
host or surpassing host defenses. Hosts, on the other hand, pay
a cost of parasitism, but the evolution of new defenses (largely
relying on cognitive functions such as perception and executive
functions) must be balanced against the frequency of parasitism
and the costs of producing better defenses (Rothstein, 1982;
Davies and Brooke, 1988, 1989a,b; Lotem, 1993; Lotem et al.,
1995). Costs of new defenses include developing the cognitive
or morphological structures for new defenses as well as the
added risk of expressing those defenses (e.g., rejecting own eggs),
and these costs influence the evolution of recognition abilities.
Plasticity in host recognition reveals the importance that making
an incorrect choice can have for the evolution of egg rejection.
For example, some common cuckoo hosts avoid rejecting their
own eggs (recognition error) when parasites are not present by
only increasing rejection rates when adult cuckoos are seen in
the vicinity of the nest (Davies and Brooke, 1988). In South
American coots, intraspecific parasitism leads to egg rejection,
but an interspecific parasite, the blackheaded duck, that imposes
no parental care costs is only rejected when ecological conditions
render incubation more costly (Lyon and Eadie, 2004). Globally,
studies of avian brood parasites have provided an excellent
understanding of the selective environment generated by host–
parasite interactions that influences the evolution of recognition
and rejection of eggs.
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Mimicry-recognition-rejection arms races reveal the link
between cognitive abilities and the evolutionary dynamics of
host–parasite systems. Arms races in avian brood parasites
related to egg mimicry push host recognition systems to
identify parasites while avoiding recognition errors (Rothstein,
1982; Davies and Brooke, 1988; Lotem, 1993; Lotem et al.,
1995; Rodríguez-Gironés and Lotem, 1999). The accuracy of
identifying a mimetic egg depends on visual discrimination
abilities and recent studies have begun to specifically integrate
this process using ‘visual modeling’–information on cone
sensitivity and objective measures of egg color patterns–to
understand rejection behavior, or the lack thereof, in some species
(Cassey et al., 2008; Spottiswoode and Stevens, 2010). Recent
findings show that visual detection of parasites can improve
by integrating multiple sources of information (Spottiswoode
and Stevens, 2010) a hallmark of complex decision-making.
Egg cues (Langmore et al., 2009; Spottiswoode and Stevens,
2010; Svennungsen and Holen, 2010; de la Colina et al., 2012),
external cues of parasite presence (Davies and Brooke, 1988),
or counting the number of eggs laid (Lyon, 2003) have all been
shown as means to improve the decision to reject parasite eggs.
Use of multiple and disparate cues to improve the accuracy of
rejection behavior would require executive functions to weigh
these different criteria in a rejection decision and future research
could examine this cognitive ability. Not all host species reject
eggs or chicks, which implies that physiological or cognitive
limitations may also influence the detection of a parasitic egg
(Rothstein, 1982; Davies and Brooke, 1988; Lotem, 1993; Lotem
et al., 1995; Rodríguez-Gironés and Lotem, 1999), but studies on
the cognitive aspects of this pattern are currently lacking.
An understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying
rejection have also played an important role in understanding
why despite close visual mimicry in eggs, nestlings are rarely
mimetic. One hypothesis is that unlike egg recognition where
comparisons between multiple host eggs and a single parasitic
egg makes discrimination possible, having only a single parasite
chick in the nest (e.g., common cuckoos) could have severe long
term fitness costs if birds learn the appearance of their chicks
(Lotem, 1993). Indeed, learning does seem to play a role in
identification and discrimination of eggs (Rothstein, 1974, 1978;
Strausberger and Rothstein, 2009) and possibly chicks (Shizuka
and Lyon, 2010; Colombelli-Négrel et al., 2012). A possible
solution in some species, such as the North American coot, might
be to use extra cues such as hatch order and soft rejection (e.g.,
lower feeding) to help identify parasitic chicks while reducing
the risk of mis-imprinting (Shizuka and Lyon, 2010, 2011). In
essence, behavior may mitigate the fitness effects of constraint
on cognitive functions such as recognition accuracy. These
models and empirical results show that the cognitive mechanisms
underlying how a species is able to recognize its eggs and chicks
plays an important role in the evolution of the host-parasite arms
race. In turn, quantifying the fitness effects of recognition and
decision-making under a complex ecological context shows what
selective pressures shape cognitive abilities and the impact of
cognitive constraints.
Finally, a few studies have also begun to investigate the link
between neurophysiology and the ecology of brood parasites.
Initial studies focused primarily on whole brain size or
hippocampus size in brood parasites and their non-parasitic
relatives since each species should face different ecological
imperatives. Generally, whole brain size tends to be smaller
in brood-parasites than their closest relatives (Iwaniuk, 2004;
Overington, 2011; Corfield et al., 2013), which could be linked
to less complex cognitive function needed in the absence of
parental care in brood parasites (Boerner and Krüger, 2008).
Hippocampus size, however, varies predictably with the need
for excellent spatial memory in brood parasites. Brood parasites
have an enlarged hippocampus in the breeding season (Clayton
et al., 1997), the sex that searches for nests tends to have a
larger hippocampus than the other sex (Sherry et al., 1993;
Reboreda et al., 1996), and brood parasites have a relatively larger
hippocampus than closely related non-parasites (Reboreda et al.,
1996; Corfield et al., 2013). Furthermore, recent analysis has
uncovered a specific region of the hippocampus that is enlarged
in parasitic species relative to others (Nair-Roberts et al., 2006),
suggesting brain regions may have evolved to manage the specific
needs of brood parasites relative to other spatial memory. These
studies provide a rare example of direct linkage between ecology
and neurophysiology on a well understood fitness landscape. An
exciting next step in such systems could be to examine variation
in neural structure with variation in the ability of different hosts –
either across or within a species – to reject parasitic eggs or chicks.
The above studies provide some of the best examples of how
discrimination ability links with cognitive decision making under
natural ecological conditions. While many of these host-parasite
studies have not specifically been framed in terms of cognitive
ecology, the focus on discrimination, recognition, learning, and
decision making are all clearly linked to cognition and could
further link to both specific cognitive abilities studied in other
organisms and to neurophysiological studies. Together with
the strong understanding of the fitness costs and benefits of
host-parasite coevolution, these systems provide an excellent
opportunity to link cognition, neurophysiology, and evolutionary
biology.
The above examples illustrate the power of the fitness
approach in linking ecological context to the evolution of
cognitive abilities and neural structure. The focus on the fitness
costs and benefits of specific abilities could provide added
insight into the evolutionary dynamics of cognitive traits, why
certain cognitive traits do not evolve, how variation in selection
pressures contribute to the evolution of cognition (Figure 3),
and under what conditions specific cognitive abilities should
be favored. Of course the fitness approach does have some
drawbacks that will undoubtedly limit its reach in the short
term. Fitness studies are very time intensive and resource
hungry, yet usually provide information on only one species
in one context. Gathering sufficient information on multiple
environments and across species will take time. Furthermore,
fitness studies focus on contemporary selection and must assume
that current conditions are representative of conditions during
the evolution of the focal traits from simpler versions or from
different versions in other species. Still, the ability to disentangle
effects that contribute to the evolution of cognition (Figure 3)
and experimentally test hypotheses to determine causative effects
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make the fitness approach an under-utilized method that would
nicely complement comparative studies. Below, we outline some
of the major areas where we think this fitness approach can
provide the most interesting contributions to our understanding
of cognitive evolution.
TOWARD INTEGRATIVE STUDIES OF
NATURAL SELECTION ON
NEUROCOGNITIVE TRAITS
First steps have been taken to develop a new line of research in
the evolution of cognition by looking at contemporary selection
in wild animal populations (Keagy et al., 2011; Cole et al., 2012;
Cauchard et al., 2013; Isden et al., 2013; Thornton et al., 2014;
Morand-Ferron and Quinn, 2015; Morand-Ferron et al., 2015a).
However, as with every nascent field, many issues have yet to
be addressed. Some of the issues raised so far are that we still
need to develop psychometric methods and new technologies to
measure cognition in the wild (Thornton et al., 2014; Morand-
Ferron et al., 2015b; Shaw et al., 2015), we need to deal with
confounding variables such as motivation or personality (Rowe
and Healy, 2014; Morand-Ferron et al., 2015a), and we need to
show consistent individual differences in cognition (Griffin et al.,
2015; Morand-Ferron et al., 2015a). Furthermore, variation in
cognition may not necessarily have fitness consequences in some
species or some populations, so we need sufficient sample sizes
to determine when cognitive variation is important to fitness and
therefore evolving (Rowe and Healy, 2014).
We believe that it is now time to increase integrative studies of
contemporary selection of cognition. In addition to measuring
specific cognitive functions and fitness, a number of related
lines of inquiry have already been highlighted by others. To
give just one example, quantitative genetics and measures of
heritability will be critical to understanding how cognition will
evolve, the degree to which genes and the environment affect
cognition, and how genes related to different cognitive capacities
interact and coevolve (Croston et al., 2015; Morand-Ferron
et al., 2015a). Recent advances in gene expression (Young et al.,
1997; Young and Wang, 2004) and gene modification (Kelly
and Goodson, 2014; Dance, 2015) also provide new tools to
understanding the genomic basis of cognition and how selection
acts at this level. Many other related lines of inquiry will need to
be developed, and below we highlight a few that we feel are most
urgent.
Here we highlight three challenging topics in fitness studies
of cognition that we believe will provide important insight
to cognitive neurosciences (Figure 2). First, development of
minimally invasive psychophysics and neurosciences methods
could help integrate neurosciences with the fitness approach
to draw parallels and contrasts between traditional lab-based
cognition studies and cognition in the wild. Second, we need
a better understanding of the ecological and social agents of
selection that acts on cognition. In other words, what ecological
problems have specific cognitive traits evolved to solve? Finally,
integration of ecologically relevant behaviors that influence
fitness and life history in wild populations with cognitive
functions that underlie these behaviors could prove critical in
linking how selection acts on variation in cognition.
Integration of Cognitive Neurosciences
Methods
Adaptive specialization in brain structure and cognition has been
successfully investigated at the population level by sacrificing
birds and using common garden experiments (Pravosudov and
Roth, 2013). However, a totally different approach has to be taken
for one interested in measuring selection on cognition and the
brain. Studying the fitness consequences of individual differences
in neurocognitive traits implies interfering as little as possible
with wild animals and thus, requires the development of new
methods and approaches (Figure 2).
The lack of exchange between cognitive scientists and
behavioral ecologists has left a big gap between methods used to
study contemporary selection on cognition in the wild (Keagy
et al., 2009; Cole et al., 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; Isden
et al., 2013) and current methods used in psychophysics or
comparative cognition (Fagot and Bonté, 2010; Steurer et al.,
2012). The first studies to bridge this gap have mainly been
carried out using problem-solving tasks, for which underlying
cognitive and neural mechanisms remain vague (Healy, 2012;
Rowe and Healy, 2014; Thornton et al., 2014) or using custom
made mechanical tasks which require a lot of manipulation
by experimenters and therefore only allows tests on a limited
number of individuals (Isden et al., 2013). Use of psychometrics
methods has been proposed, but not yet implemented in studies
in the wild (Thornton et al., 2014). Such an approach would
move the field toward more standardized measures of cognitive
functions. However, this approach also clearly implies the use of
new hardware to collect cognitive performances in wild animals
(Morand-Ferron et al., 2015a). The first step in that direction
has been taken by Morand-Ferron et al. (2015b) who managed
to run a fully automated associative learning task on 80 free
ranging tits equipped with passive integrated transponders (PIT
tags) using portable operant boxes. The next step to reach current
standards of cognitive testing in comparative cognition (Fagot
and Bonté, 2010; Steurer et al., 2012) would be to develop
systems equipped with touch screen displays and therefore the
possibility to run virtually any of the classical psychophysics or
cognitive task developed by psychologists. Likewise, development
of embedded cameras or microphones could reveal spontaneous
cognitive capabilities like tool use, social cognition, or vocal
communication (Rutz et al., 2007; Krause et al., 2013; Anisimov
et al., 2014).
To our knowledge, no study has yet examined contemporary
selection directly on brain structure or function of wild
animals. And yet, new recording methods to collect neural
activities in wild animals open many opportunities to launch
a research line neurocognitive selection. Mini embedded EcoG
(electrocorticogram) recorders, called neuro-loggers, have been
developed to track neural activities of free ranging wild animals.
This method has been successfully adapted to different species:
pigeons (Vyssotski et al., 2006, 2009), ostrich (Lesku et al.,
2011), sloths (Rattenborg et al., 2008), sandpipers (Lesku et al.,
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2012), or owls (Scriba et al., 2014). The study on sandpipers
illustrates that such tool can be used to link brain activity
recorded in wild animals, for instance using individual brain
rhythm characteristics, to fitness (Lesku et al., 2012). Linking such
measurements with cognitive tests and/or measures of behavior
and fitness would provide unique insight into selection on brain
function in natural environments.
Measurements of cognitive performance or neural function in
the wild can be challenging, but an initial approach conducting
such measures on wild animals during short term captivity might
represent a start in the right direction. Captivity allows for control
of motivation through food deprivation and offers standardized
environmental and social conditions to each individual. Such an
approach has been used to link cognition in captivity with fitness
in the wild (Cole et al., 2012) and to characterize differences in
cognition between populations in common garden experiments
(Pravosudov and Roth, 2013). Likewise, non-invasive MRI or
PET methods also appear as very promising tool to study
selection on neural structure and function (Van der Linden et al.,
2009; Cross et al., 2012, 2013; Marzluff et al., 2012; De Groof
et al., 2013). Recent work in birds has generated MRI brain atlases
for a number of species (Poirier et al., 2008; De Groof et al.,
2013, 2015; Güntürkün et al., 2013), and could be used to more
easily examine variation among individuals in neural structure
and function in wild birds during short term captivity. However,
for linking individual differences to fitness, these approaches in
captivity are not ideal since stress induced by captivity is likely to
affect fitness, but also cognitive performance (Pravosudov, 2003).
Despite this drawback, these methods do provide a solid first step
in the right direction of studying selection on cognition in the
wild.
Integrating Ecological and
Socio-Ecological Contexts of Selections
To better understand when and why cognition is under selection,
it is critical to identify the agents of selection, by measuring
possible social and ecological contexts of selection along with
fitness (Figure 2). In other words, identifying the agents of
selection on a cognitive ability allows us to understand under
what ecological or social conditions you would expect the
evolution of specific capacities. In turn, this helps us better
understand cognitive processes through the problems they are
meant to solve. Indeed, it is quite possible that what we measure
as a specific cognitive ability in many different systems (e.g.,
memory), might actually serve different functions in each system
and therefore we might anticipate differences in the details of
how such memory works. For example, memory in food hoarding
birds might operate differently than spatial memory in brood
parasites since the accuracy and number of items to recall may be
very different. Likewise, selection can vary across time (Chaine
and Lyon, 2008; Siepielski et al., 2009), and focus on specific
agents of selection on cognition can help us understand the causes
of temporal fluctuations in selection and their evolutionary
consequences (Bro-Jørgensen, 2010; Kingsolver et al., 2012).
By identifying the agents of selection, we gain insight into
why differences might exist in cognitive performances between
species, between populations of a single species, and between
individuals within a population (e.g., between genders, between
individuals playing different strategies (Reboreda et al., 1996;
LaDage et al., 2013). Furthermore, it allows us to understand
the ecological context of cognition, why particular cognitive
traits evolve, and may help us identify nuances within a specific
cognitive ability that evolved in two different contexts.
Equally important to identifying agents of selection is the
ability to exclude potential agents of selection that might act
on a cognitive trait. Some have argued that cognitive variation
does not necessarily have fitness consequences (Rowe and Healy,
2014), and supporting this notion would also require showing
that selective agents logically linked to that cognitive ability does
not act. By identifying which contexts do or do not cause selection
on a cognitive ability, we can understand when and where
specific traits will evolve (Figure 2). Socio-ecological contexts of
selection could correspond to natural gradients in sociality (e.g.,
population density, gregariousness, social strategy distribution),
habitat quality (e.g., level of fragmentation, urbanization) and/or
distribution of resources (e.g., food or nest site availability,
harshness of the environment). Experimental manipulations of
ecological factors, such as variation in food supplementation or
reintroduction in a novel environment are of particular interest
to isolate ecological causes of selection and an important tool in
excluding certain hypothesized agents of selection.
Most cognitive abilities intervene in a broad array of
contexts and behaviors, so understanding selection on and the
evolutionary dynamics of cognitive abilities requires identifying
and understanding all, or at least many, of these contexts.
For example, spatial memory will play a role in recalling
the placement of food, predators, potential mates, territory
boundaries, and migration routes among other things, yet the
importance of accuracy, benefits of forgetting, and fitness gained
from each is likely different. Consequently, overall selection
will reflect the importance of each task relative to fitness. The
identification of a number of different agents of selection on a
single cognitive trait, allows us to understand the complementary
or conflicting effects that the environment can have on the
evolution of cognitive abilities which often function in many
different contexts (see next section; Figure 3).
Integration of Behaviors and Cognition
under Selection
The links between cognitive abilities, behaviors in the wild, and
fitness can be intricate and therefore will lead to complex patterns
of selection (Figure 3). Behaviors are usually what is exposed
to selection from the ecological and social environment, yet the
relationship between cognition and complex behaviors is not
always straight forward making it difficult to directly link fitness
and cognitive performances. The link between cognition and
behavior matters because a given cognitive trait could contribute
to a number of behaviors and if selection acts differently on each
behavior, you will get very different selection dynamics on the
underlying cognitive trait (Lande and Arnold, 1983; Schluter,
1996; Sinervo and Svensson, 2002). Likewise, if two cognitive
traits act in concert to produce a specific behavior, you can
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get correlated evolution and even genetic coupling of those
cognitive traits (i.e., linkage disequilibrium between genes coding
different cognitive functions; Sinervo and Svensson, 2002). This
problem is exacerbated for neural structures since a given neural
structure likely underlies a number of cognitive abilities and each
cognitive ability relies on a number of brain regions. Given that
multiple cognitive abilities likely interact with multiple behaviors
(Figure 3), we expect strong correlational selection effects to
act on the evolution of cognition. Without clear mapping of
different agents of selection on multiple behaviors as well as
mapping the links between multiple behaviors and multiple
cognitive abilities, we will have only a poor understanding of the
evolutionary dynamics underlying cognition. Not doing so can
lead to erroneous conclusions about whether selection is acting
on a cognitive trait, how intense selection is on a trait, and how
cognition evolves over longer time scales.
A useful approach to disentangle the multi-faceted
interactions between behaviors, cognitive traits, and fitness would
be to employ path analysis or structural equation modeling
(Wright, 1934; Li, 1975; Thomas et al., 2007; Frank, 2013;
Westland, 2015). Researchers define one or more hierarchical
path models (e.g., Figure 3) and use their data to estimate the
links between traits and their relationship with fitness (e.g.,
Sinervo and DeNardo, 1996; Svensson et al., 2001; Sih et al., 2002;
Thomas et al., 2007; Frank, 2013). This provides a nice match
to the problem at hand since in essence, mapping selection to
cognition is more evocative of a network than a simple flow
diagram making a multi-variate approach to link ecology to
behavior to cognition is essential. Variation in space or time can
also be examined by estimating alternative models with datasets
that correspond to different scenarios (e.g., Sih et al., 2002),
thereby specifically examining how selection might fluctuate
or differ between populations. Finally, researchers can test
alternative path models to better understand the relationships
between cognitive traits, behaviors, and fitness using both
observational data and experiments (Wootton, 1994; Sinervo
and DeNardo, 1996). Indeed, manipulations (e.g., behavior,
hormones, or gene products/mRNA that influence the cognitive
trait) are a very important tool in disentangling the links between
traits and such results can be directly used in a path framework.
Overall, structural equation modeling provides an important
tool to understand the complex relationships we expect between
cognition, behavior, and selection and how these relationships
will influence the evolution of cognition.
CONCLUSION
We have highlighted two ways to investigate the evolution of
cognitive processes in animals: the comparative approach focuses
on evolutionary history while the fitness approach examines
contemporary selection. Much of our knowledge on the evolution
of cognition comes from the comparative approach and the full
application of recently developed phylogenetic tools should allow
for interesting new results in this line of research. However,
since cognition presents all the characteristics of traits under
selection (variation, heritability, and fitness benefits), we believe
that taking the fitness approach to cognitive function will allow
us to better explore the evolutionary mechanisms that shape
animal minds. Furthermore, the fitness approach more easily
allows us to integrate proximate and ultimate factors underlying
animal cognition in a single study, as suggested 50 years ago
by Tinbergen (1963) and to identify agent of selection. In
both cases, understanding the natural context under which
cognitive functions evolve, provides an interesting and different
perspective to complement studies of cognition in model species
held in captivity.
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